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Abstract—The formation of consortiums of a broadband access
Internet Service Provider (ISP) and multiple Content Providers
(CP) is considered for large-scale content caching. The consor-
tium members share costs from operations and investments in
the supporting infrastructure. Correspondingly, the model’s cost
function includes marginal and fixed costs; the latter has been im-
portant in determining industry structure. Also, if Net Neutrality
regulations permit, additional network capacity on the ISP’s last
mile may be contracted by the CPs. The number of subscribers is
determined by a combination of users’ price elasticity of demand
and Quality of Experience. The profit generated by a coalition
after pricing and design optimization determines the game’s
characteristic function. Coalition formation is by a bargaining
procedure due to Okada (1996) based on random proposers
in a non-cooperative, multi-player game-theoretic framework.
A necessary and sufficient condition is obtained for the Grand
Coalition to form, which bounds subsidies from large to small
contributors. Caching is generally supported even under Net
Neutrality regulations. The Grand Coalition’s profit matches
upper bounds. Numerical results illustrate the analytic results.
Index Terms—Content Delivery, Nash Bargaining, Net Neutral-
ity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The growth of commercial grade Web applications, such
as video streaming, has been rapid. Content from providers
such as Netflix and YouTube already constitutes a substantial
fraction of all Internet traffic, and the trend is strongly up-
wards. For instance, in the first quarter of 2018, Netflix and
YouTube accounted for over 50% of Internet traffic during
peak hours every day, with their respective shares of the
downstream traffic being 31.62% and 18.69% [1]. Netflix itself
has 125 million subscribers world-wide in 2018 [2]. This poses
well-recognized challenges, and caching (in all its various
forms) has been recognized as an important technique to
address performance in this environment. See, for instance, T.
Leighton’s illuminating paper [3]. Caching to be effective re-
quires cooperation at various levels, ranging from engineering
to business, between the players, i.e., Content Providers, the
ISP that controls the last mile to the end-user, and the transit
ISPs. Lack of such cooperation was plainly visible in 2014 in
the national press on the matter of the throttling of Netflix’s
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traffic by Comcast and other ISPs. However, the relationships
have turned benign recently [4], perhaps in part because of
the mutual benefits from the deployment of Netflix’s Open
Connect caching system [5]. Besides ISP-CP relationships,
other important factors that determine the scale of caching
are user behavior and government regulations, notably Net
Neutrality. In this paper we take a broad view of the interests
and behavior of the afore-mentioned players and factors, with
the goal of providing insights into new approaches to very
large scale caching for Internet content delivery.
It is useful to review the performance bottlenecks that
caching addresses. Latency is a major determinant of users’
Quality of Experience [6]. Leighton [3] argues that the limiting
bottleneck, which he calls the ”distance bottleneck” and also
the ”middle mile”, is the time spent in traversing the Internet,
between the content source and the last mile. It is noted in [3]
that latency and throughput are inversely related. A table in [3]
shows the contrast between the following two connections, (i)
local of less than 100 miles, and (ii) cross continental of about
3000 miles. Respective performances are as follows: latency
of 1.6 ms vs 48 ms, throughput of 44 Mbps vs 1 Mbps, and
download time for 4GB content of 12 min vs 8.2 hrs.
A recent paper [7] models and analyzes related issues
based on the Stackelberg leader-follower model of business
interaction between ISP and a single CP. The Stackelberg
model is well established [8]. However, we argue that it’s
use in the context here has several shortcomings: (a) The
assumption of the ISP as leader and CP as follower may
not be justified currently and, arguably, in the future as well;
(b) as a model of business interaction it leaves much to be
desired, i.e., comparisons of combined profits of all players in
the Stackelberg models to the normative benchmark is highly
unfavorable to the former; (c) predictions of effects of Net
Neutrality policy are questionable. Let us explain.
Susan Crawford [9] wrote vividly in 2013 about Netflix’s
fight for survival in the face of the opposition of incumbents,
notably Comcast. The picture today is rather different. Net-
flix’s market capitalization is $ 173 Billion, while Comcast’s
is $ 161 Billion. It is positioned today as a leader of the
content streaming industry, and indeed all the major streaming
video companies are major players with considerable heft. The
bargaining power of these players, exemplified by Netflix, is
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substantial, and certainly in excess of what follower status in
the Stackelberg model bestows.
The data in [7] shows that the combined profit of the ISP
and CP in the Stackelberg model is substantially less than
what may be considered the normative benchmark, i.e., the
profit realized in the idealized setting in which the players
cooperate in pricing and system design to maximize combined
profit. However, no model is proposed for how the normative
profit benchmark could be realized in a competitive setting.
In the analysis of Net Neutrality, it is proven in [7] that if
regulations prohibit incremental network capacity to the CP’s
service, then caching collapses. The explanation given is that
it is in the ISP’s interest to increment the unit price for cache
since it increases its profit, even though it is in ever decreasing
amounts, and the CP as a follower must accept; however, the
impact of such price increases on the CP’s profit is increasingly
negative, leading it to decrease cache deployment until the null
point is reached. Any observer will be justified in thinking that
there must be a better way to run a business!
There are other important deficiencies in [7] that are ad-
dressed here. The most important of these is the fixed common
costs that are incurred by the ISP and CPs. The fixed costs are
due to infrastructure, equipment, building, stable and reliable
power supply, air-conditioning, repairs, etc. Such costs as dis-
tinct from marginal costs that are proportional to the number
of subscribers, cache and enhanced network capacity. Fixed
common costs are well-known factors in the economics of the
communications industry, where they are typically large, and
are known to have significant impact on industry structure with
respect to barriers to entry, formation of natural monopolies,
and regulations; see, for instance, [10] and [11].
A related feature of the model here, absent in [7], is the
presence of multiple, possibly heterogenous CPs. Especially in
the presence of large fixed costs, a natural business framework
is where these costs can be shared. Indeed, this is key here.
We seek an investment and operating framework in which
the industry players compete for profit, yet are driven to
cooperate out of self-interest, and also where their bargaining
powers are not skewed. The framework that we propose is non-
cooperative game theory, with Nash bargaining as the basis
for coalition formation. More specifically, although the results
apply for other protocols, we focus on a protocol with random
proposers due to Okada [12]. The well-known advantage to the
first proposer is eliminated and a level bargaining field exists.
We give an overview of our results. (i) Our first challenge is
to obtain the characteristic function values for any coalition, or
subset, of the set of all players, which comprise one ISP and K
CPs. These values correspond to the coalition’s profit obtained
after design optimization. The profit function has the attractive
feature of being additive over components corresponding to
each CP with the only coupling due to the common fixed
cost F. The optimization is with respect to the price (or fee)
paid by its subscribers, the cache size and incremental network
capacity for each CP. We obtain the optimum price explicitly,
and show that the profit function is concave with respect to
cache size, which gives a simple condition for its optimum.
(ii) For the protocol of random proposers, Okada [12] obtains
a necessary and sufficient condition for the Grand Coalition to
form. We obtain a simple equivalent condition for our model.
An interpretation of this condition is that subsidies from large
profit contributors to small profit contributors may exist in
the coalition, but are bounded. Specifically, the gap between
the average and the smallest contribution is subject to an
upper bound. (iii) The operational implication of this result
is that it is necessary to apply a form of Coalition Admission
Control for the Grand Coalition to form. (iv) Our analysis and
numerical results show that Net Neutrality regulations do not
lead to the abandonment of caching. This shows that results to
the contrary in [7] are artifacts of the Stackelberg model. (v)
We show that if the Coalition Admission Control condition is
satisfied by all the players in the coalition, then it will remain
satisfied even if CPs drop out. (vi) We compare the egalitarian
payoff to all players, which is implied by the bargaining for
the formation of the Grand Coalition, to the Shapley Value
payoffs, and find that the non-cooperative foundations yield
a rather different cost-sharing formula. (vi) Our numerical
results illustrate and corroborate the analysis. An example
is given where Net Neutrality regulation has the effect of
reducing the number of CPs that may join the coalition.
Also, an example is given in which cache and incremental
network capacity act as economic substitutes over a wide range
of parameter values. (We use the terms ”consortiums” and
”coalitions” interchangeably, typically in business and analytic
contexts, respectively).
There is a body of prior work on pricing and economics
of Content Delivery Networks (CDNs)[13-15]. CDNs act as
intermediaries between ISPs and CPs, and they have had
an important role in the Internet. However, in the model
considered here this role is taken on by the large CPs. This is
best exemplified by Netflix, which earlier had relied on CDNs
[16], and now is largely its own CDN. Admittedly it remains
to be seen what role CDNs will play in the future. Also, there
is considerable prior work on algorithms and deployment of
caching [17-18]. Since our focus is elsewhere, we rely on a
basic and early model of caching [19].
II. MODELS
A. Model of System and Subscribers
Our system model has multiple heterogeneous CPs. Each CP
may have its content stored in various geographically dispersed
locations, typically in the cloud and at some distance from
the ISP’s datacenters. Assume that CP k has content of size
Σk(k = 1, 2, . . . ,K).
While our interest is in latency (of bits), which is measured
in units of time, in the analysis we find it convenient to
use the notion of network capacity, which is correlated with
throughput and behaves in inverse relationship to latency, and
thus has units of bits per unit time.
The system that we consider, see Fig.1, has a cache of size
Sk dedicated to CP k’s content; the cache is located at or
close to the ISP’s datacenter at the termination point of the
last mile. In the event of a cache hit, i.e., the content selection
by end-user of CP k happens to be stored in the cache, the
total latency experienced by the user is for content delivery
over the last mile only, whereas in the event of a cache miss
there is additional latency due to traversal of the Internet from
content source to the last mile, which is typically large. Let
r1 and r2, respectively, correspond to the network capacity in
the event of a cache hit and cache miss, so that r1 > r2.
Let hk denote the cache hit probability. Following Serpanos
et. al. [19], we assume
Fig. 1: System Model
hk =
log (Sk + 1)
log Σk
(1)
The average network capacity of users of CP k is denoted by
Rk, where,
Rk = r1hk + r2(1− hk) (2)
We consider a second performance-enhancing feature, which
is network capacity enhancement of βk per user of CP k over
the ISP’s last mile infrastructure. This enhancement augments
r1, the default network capacity for all users. Capacity en-
hancements need to be negotiated between the CPs and the
ISP, and subject to regulations. If the enhancement is enabled
then its effect is to modify the average network capacity for
users of CP k thus,
Rk = (r1 + βk)hk + r2(1− hk) (3)
We adopt the model for user behavior in [7] where the
number of subscribers to the service offered by CP k, nk,
depends on two major factors, pricing and Quality of Experi-
ence (QoE). We let nk be given in product-form,
nk(pk, βk, Sk) = Dk(pk)Qk(βk, Sk) , (k = 1, 2, . . . ,K)
(4)
Here Dk(pk) represents the effects of the price for the service,
pk, and Qk(βk, Sk) represents QoE effects. Specifically, user
response to price is based on constant price elasticity of
demand [8,20,21]:
Dk =
Ak
pεkk
(5)
where εk > 0 is the constant elasticity, and Ak is a measure
of the potential pool of subscribers. Note that,
∂Dk
∂pk
pk
Dk
= −εk, (6)
i.e., the constant elasticity is the percentage change in demand
for an infinitesimal percentage change in the price. We further
assume that εk > 1, which is consistent with the historical data
in [21] from communications and electric power industries.
The function Qk represents effects of QoE on subscription.
Following Reichl at al. [22], we let the logarithmic function
map QoS to QoE, with QoS given by the average network
capacity experienced by users of CP k, Rk, i.e.,
Qk(βk, Sk) = logRk(βk, Sk) (7)
Without loss of generality, we choose units such that r2 = 1
in (3). Then,
Rk(βk, Sk) = (δr + βk)hk + 1 , (k = 1, 2, . . . ,K) (8)
where δr = r1 − r2 = r1 − 1 > 0. Hence, from (4) - (8), the
number of subscribers of CP k,
nk(pk, βk, Sk) =
Ak
pεkk
logRk(βk, Sk) (9)
B. Costs
We collect here information on costs assumed in the model.
Importantly, we have included fixed common costs incurred
separately by the ISP and CPs. Let c be the cost incurred by
all CPs to support each subscriber, so that the corresponding
marginal cost incurred by CP k is cnk. This cost is due to
expenses such as billing, authentication, etc. CP k’s expense
for caching is c(S)k per unit of cache installed, so that its cache
installation cost is c(S)k Sk. It’s fixed cost is denoted by fk.
The ISP’s fixed cost, typically large, is given by F . It is
tacitly understood that this fixed cost is incurred by the ISP
only if an agreement for a coalition to form is reached. We
also let η(S) and η(β) respectively denote the unit costs for
cache and network capacity incurred by the ISP.
C. Non-Coalitional Business Model
In this business model, the ISP sells to each CP cache and
network capacity at unit prices, and incurs unit costs described
above for providing these resources; the unit prices may be
specific to the CP. Each CP’s revenue comes from fees paid
by its subscribers. Let the unit price set by the ISP for the
sale of cache and network capacity to CP k be t(S)k and t
(β)
k ,
respectively. The profit of the ISP and CP k are given by,
piISP (p,β,S) =
K∑
k=1
{(t(β)k −η(β))βknk+(t(S)k −η(S))Sk}−F
(10)
pik(pk, βk, Sk) = (pk−c−t(β)k βk)nk−(c(S))k +t(S)k )Sk −fk
(11)
Introducing the expression for nk in (9), we obtain,
piISP (p,β,S) =
K∑
k=1
{(t(β)k − η(β))βk
Ak
pεkk
logRk(βk, Sk)
+ (t
(S)
k − η(S))Sk} − F (12)
(13)
pik(pk, βk, Sk) = (pk − c− t(β)k βk)
Ak
pεkk
logRk(βk, Sk)
− (c(S))k + t(S)k )Sk − fk
In the absence of a business agreement between the ISP and
the CPs, the cache for CP k, Sk = 0, hence the cache hit
probability, hk = 0, and Rk(βk, 0) = 1, Qk(βk, 0) = 0,
and consequently piISP (p,β,0) = pik(pk, βk, 0) = 0 , (k =
1, 2 . . . ,K).
D. Coalitional Business Model
We obtain expressions for the profit functions in the ideal-
ized setting of ”Integrated Operations” (IO) in which the ISP
and CPs jointly make business decisions to maximize their
combined profit. Thus in this setting there is no transfer of
funds from the CPs to the ISP for cache and network capacity.
We note that the full relevance of the model presented here
will become apparent in Secs. IV and V.
The notation that we follow is as follows: the players are
indexed by k, the CPs’ indices range from 1 to K, and the
ISP is indexed K+1. We let the set K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} and
K+ = K∪{K+1}. We denote any coalition of CPs by Θ ⊆ K
and the coalition inclusive of the ISP by Θ+ = Θ∪{K + 1}.
The profit for the coalition Θ+ is,
piIO(Θ
+) =
∑
k∈Θ
pik + piISP , (14)
see (12) and (13). Due to the cancellation of terms involving
t
(S)
k and t
(β)
k , which is consistent with the absence of payments
by CPs to the ISP in this setting, it follows that
piIO(Θ
+;p,β,S) =
∑
k∈Θ
Vk(pk, βk, Sk)− F (15)
where, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K,
(16)
Vk(pk, βk, Sk) = (pk − c− η(β)βk)Ak
pεkk
logRk(βk, Sk)
− (c(S)k + η(S))Sk − fk
We interpret Vk as the ”operational” profit from a ”virtual
consortium” of the ISP and CP k. The qualifiers ”operational”
and ”virtual” take note of the absence of the fixed cost F. Also,
Vk is the analogue in the coalitional setting of pik, in (13).
III. OPTIMIZATION OF COALITIONAL BUSINESS MODEL
We consider the following problem:
maxpiIO(Θ
+;p,β,S) w.r.t p,β,S. (17)
By setting ∂piIO/∂pk = 0 we obtain for the optimal fees for
subscribers, p∗,
p∗k =
εk
εk − 1(c+ η
(β)βk) (k = 1, 2, . . . ,K) (18)
The term in parenthesis is the marginal cost for subscribers.
We incorporate the above expression in piIO, and hereafter
consider piIO and {Vk} to be functions of β and S only. That
is, from (15) and (16),
piIO(Θ
+;β,S) =
∑
k∈Θ
Vk(βk, Sk)− F (19)
where, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K,
Vk(βk, Sk) = ak(βk) logRk(βk, Sk)− (c(S)k + η(S))Sk − fk,
(20)
and,
ak(βk) =
(εk − 1)(εk−1)
εεkk
· Ak
(c+ η(β)βk)(εk−1)
(21)
Here ak(βk) represents the profit component from subscriber
fees after accounting for the per-subscriber costs for subscriber
support and incremental network capacity. The other profit
component, logRk, amplifies the first profit component, and
represents the increase in subscribers due to enhancement in
QoE from the combination of caching and last mile network
capacity increment. The negative terms in (20) are the virtual
coalition’s costs for caching and the CP’s fixed cost. The
problem reduces to,
maxVk(βk, Sk) (k = 1, 2, . . . ,K) (22)
with respect to cache size Sk and capacity increment βk.
A. Optimization with Respect to Cache Size
From (20),
∂Vk(βk, Sk)
∂Sk
=
ak(βk)(δr + βk)
(log Σk)Rk
· 1
(Sk + 1)
− (c(S)k + η(S))
(23)
Since the right hand side decreases with increasing Sk, Vk
is concave in Sk > 0. Moreover, if ∂Vk(βk, 0)/∂Sk ≤ 0,
then the maximum of Vk with respect to Sk is achieved when
Sk = 0. We have
Proposition 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for
Vk(βk, Sk) to reach its maximum value at a unique positive
value of Sk is
(c
(S)
k + η
(S)) <
ak(βk)(δr + βk)
(log Σk)
(24)
If the inequality holds, then the unique optimum value of Sk
is obtained from the first order condition ∂Vk/∂Sk = 0. If the
inequality in (24) is violated, then the optimal Sk = 0.
The proof follows from the concavity of Vk(βk, Sk) with
respect to Sk; (24) expresses ∂Vk(βk, 0)/∂Sk > 0.
The interpretation of (24) is that the left hand quantity is
the unit cost of the cache to the ISP and CP k, and the right
hand quantity is the marginal profit from caching at Sk = 0.
B. Optimization of Incremental Network Capacity
The reader may verify, from (20), that
∂Vk(βk, Sk)
∂βk
= ψk(βk, Sk)ak(βk) logRk(βk, Sk) (25)
where,
ψk(βk, Sk) =
[
hk
Rk(βk, Sk) logRk(βk, Sk)
− (εk − 1)η
(β)
(c+ η(β)βk)
]
(26)
Note from (25) that the sign of ψk(βk, Sk) is the sign
of ∂Vk(βk,Sk)∂βk since the other factors are positive. Also, as
βk →∞, ψk(βk, Sk)→ 0.
If ψk(0, Sk) > 0, then, since ψk is continuous in βk, there
will be at least one positive solution to ∂Vk(βk, Sk)/∂βk = 0.
Let the smallest positive solution be β∗k , where Vk(βk, Sk) will
be maximized (possibly locally). Hence, we have
Proposition 2. If ψk(0, Sk) > 0, i.e,
η(β)
c
<
1
(εk − 1)
hk
(δrhk + 1) log(δrhk + 1))
(27)
then there exists at least one stationary maximum point of
Vk(βk, Sk) at β∗k > 0.
Note that the left hand side is the ratio of η(β) , the unit
cost of the incremental network capacity over the last mile,
and c, the per-subscriber cost.
C. Characteristic Function of the Game
For any coalition Θ, the characteristic function value v(Θ)
is the profit that the coalition generates. If the coalition does
not include the ISP (indexed K+1), the characteristic function
value is null, as is also the case for the singleton {K+1}. We
now consider a coalition of CPs and ISP, i.e., Θ ⊆ K, and
Θ+ = Θ ∪ {K + 1}.
Let the maximization of Vk with respect to βk and Sk by
the above procedures yield,
vk = maxVk(βk, Sk) , (k = 1, 2, . . . ,K) (28)
From (19),
max
p,β,S
piIO(Θ
+;p,β,S) =
∑
k∈Θ
vk − F (29)
Hence, the the characteristic function,
v(Θ+) =
∑
k∈Θ
vk − F (30)
Note that if Θ∪{k} = ∅, then v(Θ+∪{k})−v(Θ+) = vk > 0,
so that the characteristic function of the game is super-additive.
IV. COALITIONAL BARGAINING
A. Review of Related Models
Our interest is in the formation of coalitions, from the set
of players composed of an ISP and multiple CPs, within the
framework of multi-player, non-cooperative game theory. As
in two-player bargaining [23,24], the multi-player bargaining
game may be approached either via an axiomatic model,
such as the Nash bargaining model, or a strategic model
[12],[25,26]. In these games bargaining proceeds in rounds
with time discounting, i.e., payoffs are discounted by a factor
δ(δ < 1) with each additional round. In general, a player
makes a proposal, and the other players in the proposed
coalition either accept or reject the proposal. In the latter case,
the game proceeds to the next round, with a player making
another proposal. The order in which players make proposals
has significant consequences; for instance, the advantage of
the first proposer is well-known [24]. Hence models may
be classified into ”fixed order” games, where the protocol
determines the order in which players make proposals, and
”random order” games in which proposers are chosen uni-
formly at random in each round. All the models discussed
below use the Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SSPE)
as a solution concept. (Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is
a Nash equilibrium of the original game which is also a Nash
equilibrium in every subgame of the game. A solution of the
game is called SSPE if it is a SPE with the property that at
any round the strategy of every player depends only on the set
of all players active in that round.)
Chatterjee et. al. [25] consider fixed order protocols in which
the first rejector becomes the new proposer, and focus on bar-
gaining games with equilibrium that is efficient asymptotically,
i.e. efficient as δ → 1. They show that two properties of
asymptotically efficient equilibrium, namely, Grand Coalition
formation and no delay, may be violated by the stationary
equilibrium if the ”egalitarian” payoff vector (in which all
payoffs are equal) is not in the core of the game.
Compte and Jehiel [26] investigate a bargaining model
in which only one coalition can form (this is not assumed
by Okada [12]). Therefore, in super-additive games, players
bargain under the threat that a smaller team can form. In this
model it is assumed that players adopt mixed strategies, as
opposed to pure strategies assumed in [12] and [25]. The main
result in [26] is that if an asymptotically efficient stationary
equilibrium exists, then the payoff vector in the equilibrium is
identical to the one obtained by maximizing the Nash product,
which is the product of the players’ payoffs.
B. Okada’s Bargaining Model and Results
In the bargaining procedure of [12], at every round t, t =
1, 2, . . . , one player, which may be either a CP or the ISP, is
selected as a proposer with equal probability among all players
still active in bargaining. Let Kt be the set of active players
at round t, where K1 = K+. The selected player k proposes
(i) a coalition set Θ+ with k ∈ Θ+ ⊆ Kt and v(Θ+) >
0, and (ii) a payoff vector x(Θ+). All other players in Θ+
either accept or reject the proposal sequentially. If all the other
players in the coalition accept the proposal, then it is agreed
upon, and all the remaining players outside Θ+ can continue
negotiations at the next round. Otherwise, negotiations go on
to next round, and a new proposer is chosen uniformly at
random. The process continues until there is no possibility of
a coalition with positive value.
The payoffs of players are determined as follows. When a
proposal (Θ+, x(Θ+)) is agreed upon at round t, the payoff
of every member k in Θ+ is δt−1x(Θ+), where δ is the
discount factor. For players who fail to join any coalition, their
payoffs are assumed to be zero. A perfect information model
is assumed, i.e., each player has perfect information about the
history of the game whenever the player makes a decision.
In addition to the Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(SSPE), we need the concepts of (i) limit SSPE, and (ii)
limit subgame efficient SSPE. Let the game defined above
be denoted by G(K+, δ), and subgames by G(Θ+, δ). A limit
SSPE is a limit point of SSPEs of G(K+, δ) as δ goes to 1.
A SSPE of G(K+, δ) is called subgame efficient if for every
subgame G(Θ+, δ), every player proposes the full coalition
Θ+ in the SSPE. A limit subgame efficient SSPE is defined
to be a limit point of subgame efficient SSPEs of G(K+, δ)
as δ goes to 1. The notion of subgame efficiency is a strong
one as it requires that in all possible rounds of negotiations
every player proposes the full coalition of the active players.
Theorem 1 (Okada). There exists a limit subgame efficient
SSPE of the game (up to the response rule of the equilibrium
path) if and only if the game satisfies
v(Ψ+)
|Ψ+| ≥
v(θ+)
|θ+| for all θ
+ ⊆ Ψ+ ⊆ K+
The expected equilibrium payoff vector is egalitarian, i.e.,
w(Θ+) = (v(Θ
+)
|Θ+| ,
v(Θ+)
|Θ+| , . . . ,
v(Θ+)
|Θ+| )) in every subgame
G(Θ+).
The result shows that the subgame efficient SSPE of the
bargaining game G(K+, δ) exists for any sufficiently large δ
if and only if the per capita profit PC(Θ+) = v(Θ+)/|Θ+|
increases with coalition size. If the condition in the Theorem
holds, then the limit efficient SSPE will also hold for every
fixed order protocol in the bargaining model in Chatterjee et.
al. [25], and hence, as noted by Okada, the result is robust
with respect to changes in the rule governing the selection of
proposers.
V. GRAND COALITION FORMATION AND PROPERTIES
We obtain the necessary and sufficient condition for the
formation of the Grand Coalition as stated in Theorem 1. We
prove various coalition properties, including for the scenario in
which the coalition is dynamically evolving. We also compare
the payoffs to the coalition partners in our non-cooperative
game-theoretic setting to Shapley Value payoffs, which are
derived from a fair profit-allocation scheme in cooperative
games [27].
A. Grand Coalition Formation With Random Proposers
For any coalition Θ+, the per-capita profit,
PC(Θ+) =
1
(|Θ+|)v(Θ
+) =
1
(|Θ|+1)
[∑
k∈Θ
vk − F
]
(31)
Without loss of generality, we index the players such that the
following holds,
v1 ≤ v2 ≤ v3 ≤ . . . ≤ vK (32)
To establish the key condition in Theorem 1, namely, the per-
capita profit increases with increasing coalition size, consider
any two coalitions, Θ and Ψ, such that Θ ⊂ Ψ ⊆ K. Let Θc =
Ψ \Θ
Proposition 3. A necessary and sufficient condition for
PC(Ψ+) ≥ PC(Θ+) is
v1 ≥ 1
(K + 1)
[ K∑
k=1
vk − F
]
(33)
Proof:
PC(Θ+)− PC(Ψ+) =
1
(|Θ|+|Θc|+1)
[∑
k∈Θ
vk +
∑
k∈Θc
vk − F
]
−
[ ∑
k∈Θ
vk − F
]
(|Θ|+1)
=
|Θc|
(|Θ|+|Θc|+1)
[
1
|Θc|
∑
k∈Θc
vk − 1
(|Θ|+1)
[∑
k∈Θ
vk − F
]]
≥ |Θc|
(|Θ|+|Θc|+1)
[
1
|Θc|
|Θc|∑
k=1
vk − 1
(|Θ|+1)
[ K∑
k=
K−|Θ|+1
vk − F
]]
(34)
≥ |Θc|
(|Θ|+|Θc|+1)
[
v1 − 1
(|Θ|+1)
[ K∑
k=K−|Θ|+1
vk − F
]]
≥ |Θc|
(|Θ|+|Θc|+1)
K
(|Θ|+1)
[
v1 − 1
K
[ K∑
k=2
vk − F
]]
(35)
=
|Θc|
(|Θ|+|Θc|+1)
(K + 1)
(|Θ|+1|)
[
v1 − 1
K + 1
[ K∑
k=1
vk − F
]]
(36)
The proof of (34) follows from the ordering in (32), and (35)
follows from
K∑
k=2
vk −Kv1 ≥
K∑
k=K−|Θ|+1
vk − (|Θ|+1)v1 (37)
Hence, from (36), the condition in (33) is a sufficient condition
for PC(Ψ+) ≥ PC(Θ+). Necessity follows from the case
Θ = K \ {1} and Ψ = K.
We may now state (33) without reference to the particular
ordering in (32). Let the minimum and average characteristic
function values be denoted thus,
vmin(K) = min
1≤k≤K
vk and vavg(K) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
vk (38)
Corollary 1. The following conditions are equivalent to the
condition (33),
vmin(K) ≥ 1
(K + 1)
v(K+) (39)
1
(K + 1)
[vavg(K) + F ] ≥ vavg(K)− vmin(K) (40)
To recapitulate, if and only if either (39) or (40) holds then
the Grand Coalition forms, and in this case the payoff vector
is egalitarian, i.e., all players get an equal share. It is easily
verified that the egalitarian payoff vector is in the core of the
game. We denote the payoff to player k in the Grand Coalition
by wk(k = 1, 2, . . . ,K + 1), so that, for all k,
wk =
1
K + 1
v(K+) =
1
K + 1
[ K∑
k=1
vk − F
]
(41)
An interpretation of the above conditions is that subsidies
from any coalition of the bigger contributors to any coalition
of smaller contributors may exist, but these subsidies are
bounded. The role of the common fixed cost, F, is noteworthy.
It plays an essential role in justifying the coalition. Also note
that on account of the factor, 1/(K+ 1), on the left hand side
of (40), assuming that all other quantities are held fixed, the
formation of larger coalitions becomes increasingly hard.
B. Grand Coalition Formation Procedure
To recapitulate the preceding results on the Grand Coalition
formation, the following two steps are undertaken sequentially
for any candidate set of CPs and an ISP.
• Design Optimization. As described in Sec. III, the op-
timum contribution vk of CP k to the characteristic
function is computed for each CP, see (28). The nearly
separable structure of the coalition’s profit function, see
(19), allows its optimization to be decomposed into K
simpler design optimizations, each of which is specific
to a CP and the ISP.
• Coalition Admission Control. This step ensures that either
condition (39) or (40) is satisfied by all admitted CPs.
This may require denying admission to the coalition
to certain players, e.g., the smallest contributors among
the CPs. Negotiations on coalition formation proceed
with the players restricted to the admitted set. Thus, the
Grand Coalition that forms is composed exclusively of
the admitted players.
Of course, this raises various related questions, some of which
are addressed below and others that are outside the scope of
this paper. For instance, might it be possible for a group of
CPs to band together to form a new entity which will satisfy
the admission control?
C. Settlements
We make explicit the settlements that must take place
for the Grand Coalition’s foundational goal of equal payoffs
to be satisfied. The settlements that we obtain follow from
book-keeping of the revenue and costs of each player in the
coalitional business model. Since the only revenue is from
CPs’ subscribers, the settlements will involve payments from
CPs to the ISP. Let Tk denote the payment from CP k to the
ISP as settlement. Then,
Tk = (pk − c)nk − c(S)k Sk − fk − wk (42)
For the ISP, it may be verified that it’s payoff in the coalition,
wK+1 =
K∑
k=1
Tk − η(β)
K∑
k=1
βknk − η(S)
K∑
k=1
Sk − F (43)
In the context of the non-coalitional business model in II-C,
observe that
Tk = {t(S)k Sk + t(β)k βknk} (k = 1, 2, . . .K) (44)
That is, the settlement payments in the coalition may be
interpreted to be payments by CPs to the ISP for cache
and network capacity. Note, importantly, that (44) does not
uniquely determine the unit prices t(S)k and t
(β)
k .
D. Grand Coalition Sustainability in Online Environment
We consider the sustainability of the Grand Coalition in a
dynamic setting where CPs may apply to dropout and other
CPs may apply to join.
Proposition 4. If either (39) or (40) in the Corollary
to Proposition 3 holds, then, irrespective of the number
and identities of CPs which may dropout of the coalition,
the condition will continue to hold for the remaining members.
Proof: Follows immediately from the fact that (39) ensures
that the per capita profit of any coalition increases with
coalition size. This property remains intact with the remaining
members.
On the other hand, if a new CP applies to join, the satisfac-
tion of (39) is not guaranteed after its inclusion, and therefore
needs to be checked as part of the Coalition Admission Control
discussed in Sec. V-A.
E. Net Neutrality
In our model, caching may indeed be supported even when
Net Neutrality regulations apply and consequently additional
network capacity of βk to individual users of CP k is not
allowed. It is easy to see by examining (24) for the existence of
positive cache sizes in the optimized design, that this condition
may be satisfied even with βk = 0. Numerical results in Sec.
VI will bear this out.
Prior results [7] have shown that when an ISP and a CP
interact according to the Stackelberg leader-follower model,
caching is not supported when Net Neutrality regulations apply
and βk = 0. Our results show that this negative result is
an artifact of the Stackelberg model, and not intrinsic to Net
Neutrality regulations.
F. Shapley Value
Shapley Value is a concept for ”fair” profit-sharing in
cooperative game theory [27]. In our setting games are non-
cooperative. Nonetheless, it is interesting to compare and
contrast payoffs.
The Shapley Value payoff to a player is determined by
the average increment in profit that is due to its inclusion in
coalitions, with the average computed over all coalitions
Proposition 5. Let xk denote the Shapley Value payoff to
player k.
xk =
1
2
vk − 1
K(K + 1)
F , (k = 1, 2 . . . ,K) (45)
Ak
∑
k c nβ nS cS r1 r2 K F fk
2× 105 105 1 0.1 0.5 0.5 4 1 5 105 104
TABLE I: List of parameters
xK+1 =
1
2
K∑
k=1
vk − K
K + 1
F (46)
We omit the proof since it is based on straightforward
counting.
These quantities may be compared to the payoff wk =
[
K∑
k=1
vk−F ]/(K+1) to all players in the coalition. Clearly, in
the Shapley Value the ISP bears a substantially larger burden
of the fixed cost F. On the other hand, half of the value
generated by the virtual coalition (see Sec. III) composed of
CP k and the ISP goes towards the CP’s payoff, and the other
half to the ISP. It is interesting how different foundations of
business relationships give rise to different payoffs even when
they share the common goal of fair and equitable allocations.
Numerical results in Sec. VI will illustrate the allocations.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We report on numerical studies on characteristics of the
Grand Coalition, the egalitarian payoff relative to payoffs in
the Shapley Value, and the effects of Net Neutrality. Table I
gives the base model parameters, which are used throughout
this section except when explicitly stated otherwise. In the
base case, there are five homogeneous CPs.
A. Design for Profit Maximization
(a) v(K+) vs ε at η(S) = 0.5
(b) v(K+) vs ε at η(β) = 0.1
Fig. 2: Graph showing optimized coalition profit as a function of ε
(a) Dependence of Vk on Sk at  = 1.5 and η(β) = 0.1
(b) Dependence of Vk on βk at  = 1.5 and η(S) = 1
Fig. 3: Graph indicating existence of optimum β and S
Fig. 4: ISP’s Nash Bargaining and Shapley Value payoffs at different
fixed costs
Parameter η(S) = 1 η(S) = 100 η(S) = 104 η(S) = 105
p 7.32 9.3 22.59 3
h 0.710 0.388 0.079 0
S 3699.7 86.8 1.5 0
β 14.4 21 65.3 0
v(K+) · 104 12.241 9.336 3.723 0
TABLE II: Coalition profit and design parameters after optimization
in NNN case
Parameter η(S) = 1 η(S) = 100 η(S) = 104 η(S) = 105
p 3 3 3 3
h 0.7249 0.3935 0.0501 0
S 4211 90.7 0.08 0
β 0 0 0 0
v(K+) · 103 82.612 50.786 2.970 0
TABLE III: Coalition profit and design parameters after optimization
in NN case
Our results here are from the optimization of the coalitional
business model treated in Sec. III. The dependence of the
maximum profit on the price elasticity εk is not a priori
obvious. Note that increasing εk lowers the demand, see (5);
however the factor εk/(εk -1) in (18) suggests that the price
increases and demand decreases. Moreover, the dependence
of the optimum price on the amount of incremental network
capacity βk is a further complication.
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the afore-mentioned dependence
for various values of the unit costs for cache and network
capacity, η(S) and η(β), respectively. The figures show that
the optimum profit v(K+) decreases with increasing elasticity;
the optimum values of the price p∗k, cache S
∗
k and incremental
network capacity β∗k also decrease. Also, v(K+) is more
sensitive to changes in η(β) than η(S).
Fig. 3(a) shows the behavior of the profit Vk as the cache
size Sk is varied for fixed price elasticity of demand of 1.5
and incremental network capacity of 10, for various values
of the unit cost of cache. The plots corroborate the concavity
of Vk as a function of Sk, which is proven in Sec. III-A.
Similar to Fig. 3(a), Fig. 3(b) shows the behavior of Vk as the
incremental network capacity βk is varied. Concave behavior
is notably missing; however, note the existence of a stationary
maximum point, the subject of Proposition 2.
B. Shapley Value
Fig. 4 compares the payoff to the ISP in the coalition to its
Shapley Value payoff. As noted earlier, in the Shapley Value
the ISP bears almost all of the fixed cost F and half of each
CP’s fixed cost. Although the coalitional bargaining game is in
the framework of non-cooperative games, the coalition, once
formed, operates as a joint operation, i.e., the ISP and CPs
behave as a single business entity, and all the fixed costs for
setting up and operating the infrastructure are shared equally.
C. Net Neutrality
We explore the impact of Net Neutrality (NN) regulations
on the formation of coalitions. To recapitulate, our assumption
is that with NN the incremental network capacity is zero.
In the example below we contrast NN with with Non-Net
Neutrality (NNN), the base case in this paper. In this example
the price elasticity of demand ε = 1.3, the parameters in
Table I apply except the fixed cost of the fifth CP, f5 is
increased to 7.0 × 104, which has the effect of reducing this
CP’s contribution v5. (Recall that this contribution is obtained
after design optimization.)
Case 1 : NNN
v(K+) = 8.3843× 105
v5 = 1.3997× 105 > 1.3974× 105 = v(K
+)
6
Hence in this case with NNN, the Coalition Admission Control
is satisfied by the set of five CPs, and the Grand Coalition
forms.
Case 2 : NN
v(K+) = 3.4939× 105
v5 = 4.2033× 104 < 5.8232× 104 = v(K
+)
6
Hence in this case with NN, the Grand Coalition does not
form with all five CPs..
Next we provide some insight into the contrasting effects of
NN and NNN on optimized system parameters, such as price,
cache size and incremental network capacity in the special
case of a single CP, price elasticity = 1.5, and zero fixed costs,
i.e., F = f1 = 0. The results for various values of the unit
cost of cache, η(S), are shown in Tables II and III. It can
be seen that NNN leads to higher prices, QoE and profits.
Also, importantly, in the NNN case cache S and incremental
network capacity β behave as substitute resources [8]. That
is, as the unit cost of cache η(S) increases, the cache installed
decreases while the incremental network capacity increases.
Also note that at very high unit cost of cache, for both NN
and NNN, the installed cache is zero. The reason is that (24)
is no longer satisfied.
VII. CONCLUSION
We conclude by noting that the case made here for cost-
sharing consortiums applies to settings beyond ISP CP
interworking. Economic theory informs us that whenever large
fixed costs are incurred by single producers, it makes for
”natural monopolies” since a single producer can then meet
market demand at lower cost than multiple producers [10],
[11]. However, this cost advantage comes at a high price for
society. The collateral downside includes, as is well-known,
high barriers to entry to new entrants, and reduced investments
in innovations and R&D [28], [29]. Thus, the case made
here for consortiums which share costs should be considered
broadly, for instance, in newly developing areas, such as the
sharing economy and smart grids.
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